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Abstract
Economic reforms in rural China have stimulated the development ofland and labour markets. The
increasing importance of these two markets suggests that they might be closely inter-related, but proper
statistical tests are lacking. This paper examines the factors that determine the participation of farm
households in land renting and migration, and investigates whether participation in land renting and
migration influence each other, using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression. Data from a
household survey held in 2000 in three villages in the north-east of the Jiangxi Province were used to
estimate the land renting and migration equations. Household characteristics, fixed factors, household
land and labour endowments, institutional factors, and land and labour prices were used as explanatory
variables in both equations. We found that the error terms of the land renting equation and the
migration equation were strongly correlated, confirming that there is a negative relationship between
land renting and migration.
Additional keywords: bivariate probit model, household model, market imperfection, seemingly unrelated
regression
Introduction
The development ofland rental markets plays an important role in improving
agricultural productivity and rural household incomes (Faruqee & Carey, 1997; Carter
& Olinto, 1998; Deininger & Feder, ZOO1; Carter & Yao, 1999, zooz; Deininger,
zo03; Deininger & Zegarra, zo03; Deininger et a!', zo03; Deininger & Jin, zo05; Yao,
zo07). It does so through several mechanisms. First, a land rental market allows the
marginal product ofland to be equalized across households with different land-labour
endowments and thus increases allocative efficiency. Second, a land rental market
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allows households that have a comparative advantage in agricultural production or
off-farm employment to specialize, and hence boosts both farm and off-farm incomes.
Third, a land rental market increases households' investment incentives because
households can reap the benefits through higher rental prices if they choose to
participate in off-farm employment in the future.
The development of off-farm employment also plays an important role in
improving agricultural productivity and rural household incomes (Rozelle et a!', 1999a;
Reardon et a!', 2001; Taylor et a!', 2003; Anon., 2oo5a; Wouterse, 2006). First, off-
farm employment can absorb surplus labour from agriculture. Households remaining
in agriculture can consolidate farmland, extend farming operations and specialize
in (labour-intensive and high-value) agricultural production and hence increase both
land and labour productivity. Second, off-farm employment can supplement rural
household incomes and reduce poverty, thereby increasing households' investment in
agricultural inputs and human capital development, especially for those households
with credit or liquidity constraints. Third, off-farm employment can diversify rural
household incomes and reduce the income risks of households.
The emergence ofland and labour markets in China is the result of economic
reforms. In the past, off-farm employment was constrained by the household
registration system (hukou) and collective farming. Since the mid-I980s, however,
it has become a significant phenomenon in rural China. By 2000, more than 200
million rural labourers worked off-farm (De Brauw et a!', 2002; Zhang et a!', 2002).
Whereas the land rental market was thin in the past, surveys of 215 villages in eight
provinces in 1995 showed that less than 3% of total land was rented (Brandt et a!',
2002; 2004), recent studies show an increasing incidence ofland rental activities
(Lohmar et a!', 2001; Kung, 2002; Deininger & Jin, 2005). The fact that both land
rental market participation and off-farm employment have been rising in recent years
suggests that these two markets might be closely inter-related.
Many studies have analysed labour migration decisions in rural China, either at the
individual level (Zhao, 1997; 1999a; 2002; 2003; Kung & Lee, 2001; Li & Yao, 2002;
Zhang et a!', 2002; Shi et a!', 2007) or at the farm household level (Lohmar, 1999;
Rozelle et a!', 1999a; Zhao, 1999b; Taylor et a!', 2003). However, the effect ofland
rental market participation on migration decisions has only been examined by Kung
& Lee (2001) and Shi et a!. (2007)' They found that the development ofland rental
markets encouraged off-farm employment, with the land market participation decision
being exogenously determined in their studies.
Whereas the development ofland rental markets has recently attracted attention,
empirical analyses of the factors determining land market participation in rural China
are still rare (Yao, 2000; Lohmar et a!', 2001; Kung, 2002; Feng et a!', 2004; Zhang et
a!', 2004; Deininger & Jin, 2005). All of these studies included the effect of off-farm
employment, especially migration, on land rental market participation decisions.
However, only a few of these studies considered the endogenous character of off-
farm employment decisions (Yao, 2000; Kung, 2002). They all found that off-farm
employment had a positive effect on households' land rental market participation
decisions.
However, the estimation of the inter-relationship of land and labour market
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participation will be biased if household decisions on land and labour market
participation are jointly determined. Therefore, the effect (if any) that household
decisions on land rental market participation and off-farm employment have on
each other remains an unresolved issue. This paper analyses the factors determining
households' decisions on land renting and migration, and examines empirically
whether farm households' land renting and migration decisions influence each other.
The insights obtained from this study can provide an important input into the design
of appropriate policies to improve the functioning of land and labour markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter gives a brief
description of the study area and data, followed by a description of the recent trends
in land rental market development and off-farm employment in Jiangxi Province.
Thereafter the model specification is discussed and the results are presented of a
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression explaining household land renting
and migration decisions. The paper ends with conclusions and policy implications,
presented in the last chapter.
Research area and data description
This paper uses data from a farm household survey that was held in three villages in
the north-east of the Jiangxi Province, located in the south-east of China. Agriculture
plays an important role in the economy of this province. In 2004,20,4% of its GDP
was derived from agriculture, 5.2% more than the average for the whole country. Its
GDP per capita was 77% of the national average (Anon., 2oo5b).
The villages were selected using a series of criteria including economic
development level, market access and geographical conditions. Local researchers and
policy makers were consulted and several site visits were made as part of this process.
The three villages are considered representative of the diversity of rural conditions
that can be found in the north-east of the Jiangxi Province and in the much larger hilly
area of south-east China with rice-based production systems (Kuiper et a!', 2001). The
three villages selected were Banqiao in Yujiang County, Shangzhu in Guixi City and
Gangyan in Yanshan County. Banqiao is the smallest village, and is located in a hilly
area. Market access is good, with a major city located within 10 km. Shangzhu is a
middle-sized village located in a mountainous area. The transport infrastructure is bad.
It takes about two hours by car from the county capital to the hamlet where the village
offices are located. Gangyan is the most populous village. It is located in a flat area, 20
km away from a major market. Road conditions are good.
The farm household survey was carried out in 2000 and the beginning of 200l.
The questions in the survey referred to the entire year of 2000. In each village, 23% of
the households were interviewed. A stratified random sample was used for selecting
the households, with the hamlets within each village forming the strata (Kuiper et
a!', 2001). A total of 329 farm households were interviewed, 54 in Banqiao, 108 in
Shangzhu and 167 in Gangyan. The information collected included demographic
characteristics, assets, land tenure, and participation in factor markets.
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Participation in land and labour markets in the north-east
of the Jiangxi Province
Land rental market
Since the introduction of the household responsibility system (HRS) at the end of the
1970s, land use rights have been assigned to farm households on the basis of family size,
labour force, or a combination ofboth. Land transfers were initially not allowed, because
policy makers believed that land transfers would lead to a concentration ofland with
a few households, leaving most households landless. Instead, frequent administrative
reallocations ofland by village leaders have been used to correct for changes in the land-
labour ratios of households caused by demographic changes. However, administrative
reallocations are normally slow, involve high transaction costs, and are possibly subject
to bureaucratic inefficiencies and rent-seeking behaviour (Johnson, 1995). Owing to the
absence of a rural social security system, rural households in China consider land as a
form of social insurance. When households become involved in off-farm employment,
they do not usually give up their land, giving them the option of returning to farming in
case oflosing their off-farm jobs. Administrative reallocation cannot replace land market
transfers in solving these problems.
Since the mid-1980s, however, the authorities have permitted land rentals. An
overview ofland rental market participation in the three surveyed villages, sub-divided
into irrigated land and dryland, is presented in Table 1. Renting forestland is negligible
and therefore not considered in our analysis. Land rental activities are mostly limited
to irrigated land. Of all the households in the three villages, 46% rented irrigated land,
whereas only 6% rented dryland. In Banqiao village, the village with a relative large area
of dryland, 20% of the households rented additional dryland.
There were large differences between the proportion of households that rented land
and the proportion of households that leased land, especially for irrigated land. Ofall the
households in the sample, 46% rented additional irrigated land, whereas only 8% leased
Table 1. Land rental markets for irrigated land (I) and dryland (D) in three villages in 2000.
Village No.offarm Households involved in:
households
Renting
D
Self-sufficient Leasing
D D
Renting
&leasing
D
Total
D
Banqiao 54
Shangzhu lO8
Gangyan 167
Average
--------------------------- (%) ------------------------------
54 20 35 76 II 2 0 2 lOO lOO
48 3 46 96 6 0 0 lOO lOO
41 4 48 93 8 2 2 0 lOO lOO
46 6 45 91 8 2 0 lOO lOO
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irrigated land. One reason for this large discrepancy may be that those farm households
that leased their land did so to more than one household at the same time. But part of
the discrepancy may also have been caused by the fact that some farm households that
leased their land had migrated, but still retained their land use rights, and could not be
interviewed during the survey. In addition, some farm households may not have reported
leasing for fear oflosing their land in the next round ofland reallocations.
A few farm households rented and leased land at the same time. Of all the farm
households in the three villages, only one rented and leased dryland, whereas four farm
households rented and leased irrigated land simultaneously.
Labour market
Off-farmemployment
China's population recently reached 1.3 billion, with about 60% still living in rural
areas. The average size oflandholdings is only around 0.52 ha per family (Anon.,
2oo5b), which normally cannot fully employ a family's labour force. Since the early
1980s, an off-farm economy consisting of jobs in township and village enterprises
(TVEs) in urban centres and more recently private enterprises has emerged and has
accelerated its growth since 1995 (De Brauw et a!., 2002).
Local off-farm employment and migration are the two basic off-farm employment
categories. Migrants are family members working off-farm and not living together
with other household members. Households categorized as involved in migration
have at least one family member working as a migrant. Those classified as involved
in local off-farm employment have no household members who are involved in off-
farm employment working as migrants. Their impact on household incomes and
the village economy may differ substantially, because migrants live apart from other
household members and spend a large share of their earnings outside the village. Local
off-farm employment includes agricultural wage employment, non-agricultural wage
employment, and self-employment. Participation in off-farm employment in the three
villages in 2000 is presented in Table 2. Up to 82% of farm households in the three
villages participated in off-farm employment in 2000. Migration was relatively more
Table 2. Type of off-farm employment in three villages in 2000.
Village No. of farm
households
Off-farm employment
Local Migration Total
-------------------- (%) --------------------
Banqiao 54 27 43 70
Shangzu lO8 21 52 73
Gangyan 167 19 73 92
Average 21 61 82
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Table 3. Type oflabour demand for rice production in three villages in 2000.
Village No. of farm Households involved in:
households
Hired Exchange
labour labour
------------ (%) ------------
Banqiao 54 15 26
Shangzu lO8 15 38
Gangyan 167 29 45
Average 22 40
important than local off-farm employment. Of all the households in the three villages,
21% participated in local off-farm employment and 61% in migration. This difference
was mainly caused by the much higher participation in migration than in local off-farm
employment in Gangyan village. As much as 73% of farm households participated
in migration in Gangyan village, the village where per capita farmland resources are
scarce while market access is good. The overall participation in off-farm employment
is also much higher in this village (92%) than in the two other villages (70% and 73%)
due to a relatively high migration rate.
Agriculturalabourdemand
In rural China, agricultural labour markets are found despite the surplus of rural
labour. They provide mechanisms for labour-constrained farm households to deal
with labour shortages, especially during peak agricultural seasons. A distinction can
be made between agricultural wage labour and exchange labour. Exchange oflabour
mainly takes place among relatives and friends, and does not involve payment. Rural
labour demand for rice production, the most important crop in the three villages, is
shown in Table 3. Exchange labour was relatively important in these villages. Only 22%
of the farm households hired additional labour, whereas 40% of the farm households
used exchange labour in rice production. Both the hiring of agricultural labour and
exchange oflabour were highest in Gangyan village. In this village, migration was also
the highest.
Householdlabourdemandand supply
A summary of the labour market situation of households in the three villages is
presented in Table 4. Hiring out labour through off-farm employment without hiring
in agricultural labour occurred most often (63% of the farm households). Only 2%
of the farm households hired additional labour for rice production without being
involved in off-farm employment. Of the remaining households, 15% neither hired in
nor hired out labour, whereas 19% of the farm households hired labour in and out in
the same year. This latter finding provides support for the hypothesis that the optimal
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Table 4. Distribution oflabour market participation in three villages in 2000.
Village No.offarm Type oflabour participation
households
Hiring in Self-sufficient Hiring out Hiring in Total
&hiring out
----------------------- (%) ------------------------------
Banqiao 54
Shangzhu lO8
Gangyan 167
Average
7
2
22 63 7 lOO
24 61 12 lOO
7 64 28 lOO
15 63 19 lOO
permanent labour force should normally be less than the peak labour demand and be
greater than the slack labour demand (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986). Gangyan
village had the highest share of farm households that both hired in and out, and also
had the lowest share of self-sufficient households. This is consistent with the relatively
high incidence of migration and farm labour hiring in this village.
Model specification
As discussed in the foregoing, there were large differences between the proportion of
households that rented land and the proportion ofhouseholds that leased land: only
16 households leased land. Missing observations in the data set caused by migrated
households may bias the estimation results. Based on personal observations in the
research area, the data for households' land renting decisions are likely to be more
precise than the data for land leasing decisions. So we confined our analysis to
households' decisions on land renting. A dummy variable was therefore constructed for
land renting. This variable equalled I if the household rented land and 0 otherwise. Off-
farm employment included both local off-farm activities and migration. People involved
in local off-farm employment live at home. They can combine local off-farm work with
working on-farm due to the small size oflandholdings and the seasonality ofagricultural
production, and are therefore less likely to participate in the land rental market. For
that reason, we limited the analysis of participation in off-farm activities in our paper
to migration. A dummy variable for migration was used, which equalled I if the
household was involved in migration and 0 otherwise. Reduced-form equations derived
from a theoretical model of rural household decision-making presented in Appendix I
(Equations 16, 17 and 18) were used to specify the factors that potentially affect household
decisions on land renting and migration. This gives the following model:
(I)
(2)
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r
w
Z
a,p
Zh
zq
L
A
where
R ~ dummy variable for land renting (~ I if the household rented land)
M ~ dummy variable for migration (~ I if there was at least one household member
involved in migration)
~ a vector of household characteristics
~ a vector of fixed factors
~ household labour endowment
~ household land endowment (in mu; I mu ~ 1/15 hal
~ wage rate
~ land rent
~ a vector of institutional factors affecting land renting and migration
~ unknown coefficients
E, 1] ~ error terms with standard properties
It was expected that migration reduced land renting, because it reduces the amount
oflabour available for agricultural production (Yao, 2000; Lohmar et a!', 2001; Kung,
2002; Feng et a!', 2004; Zhang et a!', 2004). In the research area, land rental activities
were mainly restricted to irrigated land. Therefore, the analysis ofland rental activities
was confined to irrigated land only. Similarly, land renting was expected to have a
negative effect on migration, because renting land reduces the labour available for
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis (n ~ 278).
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
Renting land (I~yes) 0·47 0.50 0
Migration (I~yes) 0·59 0·49 0
Independent variables
Household size (persons) 4.46 LSI 14
No. of dependants (persons) 1.27 1. II 0 4
No. of durable assets 6·39 1. 84 II
No. of cattle 0.76 0.80 0 IO
Age household head (years) 46 .69 IO·35 23 75
Age adults (years) 37.82 7.30 24·5 63
Education ofhousehold head (years) 4.80 2.78 0 13
Education adults (years) 4·35 1.66 0 IO
Female-male adults ratio 1.02 0·57 0 4
Irrigated land per adult (mu) 1.94 0·93 0.25 9
Possession land contract (I~yes) 0.28 0·45 0
Land transfer rights 0.58 0.13 0
Social network (I~yes) 0.32 0·47 0
Banqiao dummy (I~yes) 0.17 0.38 0
Shangzhu dummy (I~yes) 0·33 0·47 0
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migration (Rozelle et a!', 1999b; Kung & Lee, 2001; Kung, 2002; Shi et a!', 2007).
Deleting the households with missing information on one or more variables from our
sample and leaving out the (few) households that both rented and leased land, the total
number of observations used in the analysis was 278. Descriptive statistics ofboth
dependent and explanatory variables are presented in Table 5.
The selected household characteristics (Zh) were household size, number of
dependants in a household, ratio of female to male adults, and the number of durable
assets. Number of dependants in a household was defined as the number of household
members under 16 and over 66 years old, and durable assets included durable
goods such as televisions, fridges, radios and transportation vehicles. Household
characteristics have a direct effect on consumption preferences, and may have either
positive or negative effects on the demand for leisure and consumption goods. It was
expected that larger households and those with fewer dependants consume more food.
Ifhousehold decisions are non-separable, such households may increase agricultural
production and therefore increase land renting and decrease migration.
Fixed factors (Zq) were represented by the number of cattle in the household at the
end of the previous year, the age of the household head (the average adult age), the
education of the household head (the average adult education), and the ratio of female
to male adults. Households that use cattle in agricultural production tend to rent
more land and reduce migration, because with the draft power that they provide, they
increase land and labour productivity. Renting land was expected to depend positively
on the age and education of the household head, as households with an older and more
educated head have more skills and experience and are more productive in agriculture.
For the same reasons average adult age and education were expected to negatively
influence migration. However, education can also playa role in getting access to the
limited migration opportunities. Therefore, the impact of education on migration is
ambiguous. The square of the age of the household head (the average adult age) was
added to the equation to capture possible life-cycle effects. Females and males may
differ in physical strength in agricultural production. A higher ratio of female to male
adults was expected to have a negative effect on renting land and a positive effect on
migration if males are more producti~ in agriculture.
The household time endowment (L) was determined by its labour force size and
so depends on household size and the number of dependants. In addition, it may also
depend on the ratio of female to male adults, as taking care of children and doing
housework are usually female tasks in Chinese society. Households with a relatively
large time endowment were expected to rent more land and be more involved in
migration. The household land endowment (A) was represented by the irrigated land
contracted per adult. Households with relatively more land were expected to rent less
land and participate less in migration. The square of this variable was added to the
equation to capture possible nonlinearities in its impact.
Institutional factors affecting land renting and migration (Z) were represented by
tenure security, transfer rights, and the presence of a social network. As mentioned
earlier, since the end of the 1970s, China has implemented a fundamentally new
land tenure system (the HRS). Farmland in China is legally owned by the village
collective (the hamlet). Initially, the village collective (the hamlet) distributed land use
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rights equally to individual households for a period of IS years. In 1993, the Chinese
government adopted a new policy, allowing land use rights to be extended for another
30 years. On I January 1999, the Chinese government implemented the amended Land
Administration Law (LAL). To guarantee long-term tenure security and encourage land-
attached investment, the amended LAL regulates that the village collective (the hamlet)
should sign written land contracts with individual households and the duration of the
land contract should be 30 years. The written contract should include the rights and
responsibilities ofboth parties. Both parties' rights to the contracted land are protected
by the amended LAL. Even though the Chinese government has implemented
uniform land laws and policies, different village collectives (hamlets) have their own
land institutions, such as different rules in land distribution, land adjustment, and
land transfer, different timing of implementing land laws and policies, and different
durations ofland contracts. During the survey households were asked whether they
possessed a land contract, which was taken as an indication for tenure security. Tenure
security was expected to stimulate land market participation (Lohmar, 1999; Lohmar
et a!', 2001; Kung, 2002). Secure tenure was also acknowledged as a major incentive to
improve land-attached investment (Besley, 1995). Households with secure tenure may
therefore spend more time on agriculture and have less labour available for migration.
In the survey, households were also asked whether they had the right to transfer land
within the village, the right to transfer land outside the village, inheritance rights or
mortgage rights. The information was used to derive a land transfer right indicator,
defined as the number of transfer rights enjoyed by the household, divided by four. A
high value of the land transfer right indicator was expected to have a positive impact
on land renting (Li & Yao, 2002). Land transfer rights may also promote land-attached
investment (Carter & Yao, 1999), and therefore reduce migration, because households
with more transfer rights are more likely to recoup the value ofland investment if they
should exit farming.
Another institutional factor affecting land renting and migration is the presence
of a social network. The presence of a social network may play an important role in
participating in land renting and obtaining off-farm employment. A dummy variable
was defined that equalled I if the household received remittances from family members
who did not belong to the household or if the household had participated in migration
before the survey year. Having a social network (previous migration experience may
indicate experience in land rental transactions) may reduce transaction costs of finding
partners in land rental agreements and of monitoring and enforcing these agreements,
and was therefore expected to encourage land renting. The presence of a social network
may help the household to find job information and initial accommodation in the
migration destination and therefore will positively affect migration (Kung & Lee, 2001;
Zhang & Li, 2003; Zhao, 2003).
Finally, the land rent (r) and wage rate (w) were assumed to be the same for
all households living in the same village. Two dummy variables for Banqiao and
Shangzhu village, reflecting these and other factors that systematically differed
between the villages, were therefore added to the model.
354 NJAS 55-4, 2008
Are farm households' renting and migration decisions inter-related in rural China?
Results for land renting and migration
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression was used to examine whether
participation in land renting and migration influence each other. To this end, some
of the explanatory variables should differ between the land renting and migration
equations. We assumed that land renting decisions are made in particular by the
household head, whereas migration decisions are made jointly by all household
members. As a consequence, we used the age and education of the household head to
specify the land renting equation, and the average adult age and education to specify
the migration equation. The results are presented in Table 6.
Results for land renting
As expected, the number of cattle in a household had a positive impact on the
probability of renting land. The age of the household head showed an inverted U-
Table 6. Detenninants ofland renting and migration - a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression (n ~ 278).
Independent variable
Household size (persons)
No. of dependants (persons)
Ratio female to male adults
No. of durable assets
No. of cattle
Age household head (years)
(Age household head)"
Adult age (years)
(Age adults)"
Education household head (years)
Education adults (years)
Irrigated land per adult (mu)
(Irrigated land per adult)"
Possession land contract (I~yes)
Land transfer rights
Social network (I~yes)
Banqiao dummy (I~yes)
Shangzhu dummy (I~yes)
Intercept
Log pseudo likelihood
rho
Wald test for rho ~ 0
Land renting Migration
Coefficient I z-score Coefficient I z-score
-0.05 -0·59 0·74 *** 5·47
O.II 0.86 -0.67 *** -4.83
-0.16 -1.0 9 -0.09 -0.51
0.03 0.50 -0.14 ** -2.12
0.31 ** 2.28 -0.15 -1.12
0.15 ** 2.09
-0.002 ** -2.29
0.28 ** 2·55
-0.004 *** -2.82
-0.05 -1.60
0.03 0·47
-0.16 -0·47 1.07 ** 2.3 8
-0.03 -0.5 6 -0.22 ** -2.51
0.08 0.42 0·33 1.26
0.48 0.81 0.36 0.56
-0.19 -1.07 0.96 *** 3.91
0.31 1.33 -0.68 *** -2.5 0
0.12 0.58 -0·57 ** -2.21
-2·97 * -1.72 -7·44 *** -3.3 6
- 289. 83
-0.35 (-2.80) ***
X"(I) ~ 7.83; P > X" ~ 0.005
I * ~ P < O.ro; ** ~ P < 0.05; *** ~ P < 0.01. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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shaped relationship with households' land renting decisions. The turning point
was 43 years. This finding suggests that households with young heads as well as
households with old heads are less likely to rent land than middle-aged heads. A
possible explanation is that households with young heads have less farming skills
whereas households with old heads have less physical strength; they are therefore
less likely to rent land. The other variables did not have a significant impact on land
renting. Also the joint significance of the institutional factors (possession of a land
contract, land transfer rights and presence of a social network) was tested, and the
result indicates that institutional variables had no significant impact on household land
renting decisions. The same model was therefore estimated without these institutional
variables. The results, which are not shown, differ only marginally and do not change
the conclusions drawn for the other explanatory variables.
Results for migration
The regression results indicate that household size had a positive impact on migration,
whereas the number of dependants in a household had a negative effect. These
findings confirm the results of earlier studies, which showed that larger households
and households with fewer dependants tend to migrate (Zhao, 1997; 1999a, b; 2002;
2003; Rozelle et a!', 1999a, b; De Brauw et a!', 2002). The number of durable assets
owned by a household had a negative effect on migration, suggesting that richer
households tended not to migrate. The average adult age showed an inverted U-shaped
relationship with migration, supporting the findings of previous studies (Kung & Lee,
2001; Zhang et a!', 2002). The turning point was 37 years.
Interestingly, migration showed an inverted U-shaped relationship with land
availability per adult. So households with low and households with high land
availability are more likely to stay on the farm. This result is consistent with the
finding ofLi & Yao (2002) that land resources in rural China not only have a wealth
effect, used for financing migration, but also a substitution effect that holds back
migration when the land rental market is imperfect. So households with small land
endowments may not be wealthy enough to be able to pay the transportation and other
costs to migrate, whereas households with relatively large land endowments may have
difficulties in leasing their land and therefore stay on the farm instead of migrating.
The turning point was 2.38 mu.
As expected, having a social network positively affected migration. The other two
institutional factors, possession of a land contract and land transfer rights, did not have
a statistically significant effect on the probability of migration. Finally, the results for
the two village dummy variables indicate that village-specific factors such as the wage
rate and the land rent make households in Banqiao and Shangzhu village less likely to
migrate than households in Gangyan village.
The inter-relationship between land renting and migration
After taking out the effects of the explanatory variables, the correlation coefficient
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between the error terms of the two equations was -0.35, which is statistically significant
(P < 0.01). This finding implies that there was a negative relationship between
household land renting and migration decisions. So if the household is more likely to
rent land, then the probability of migration is less and vice versa. This finding confirms
the negative impact of migration on renting land found by both Yao (zooo) and Kung
(zooz), who used village level instrumental variables to take into account the possible
endogeneity of migration decisions. This finding also confirms the negative impact
of renting land on migration found by Kung & Lee (ZOOI) and Shi et a!. (zo07), who
did not take into account the possible endogeneity ofland rental market participation
decisions.
Conclusions and policy implications
Economic reforms in rural China have led to the emergence ofland and labour
markets. Off-farm employment has become a significant phenomenon since the mid-
1980s. Recent studies also show a rapid increase in land rental transactions (Lohmar
et a!', ZOO1; Kung, zooz; Deininger & Jin, zooS). The fact that both land rental market
participation and off-farm employment have been rising in recent years suggests
that these two markets might be closely inter-related. Our study examined the factors
determining households' land renting and migration decisions, and investigated
whether households' land renting and migration decisions influence each other, using
data from a survey among 3Z9 farm households in three villages in Jiangxi Province, of
which z78 households could be used for the analysis. A seemingly unrelated bivariate
probit model was estimated to take into account the endogeneity problem of household
land and labour market participation decisions and to examine the inter-relationship of
household land renting and migration decisions.
The empirical results show that the number of cattle in a household had a positive
impact on the probability of renting land. The age of the household head showed an
inverted U-shaped relationship with households' land renting decisions, suggesting that
households with young or old heads are less likely to rent land. A possible explanation
is that households with young heads have less farming skill whereas households
with old heads have less physical strength. Institutional variables played no role in
household land renting decisions.
The analysis also showed that a larger household size and a lower number of
dependants had a positive impact on migration. The number of durable assets owned
by a household had a negative effect on migration, suggesting that richer households
tended not to migrate. The average adult age showed an inverted U-shaped relationship
with migration, indicating that both young and old households tend to work and
stay on the farm. Land availability also showed an inverted U-shaped relationship
with migration. This finding indicates that households with small land endowments
may not be wealthy enough to be able to migrate, whereas households with relatively
large land endowments may have difficulties to lease their land in case ofland rental
market imperfections. Having a social network was found to have a positive effect on
migration.
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The empirical evidence indicates that land renting and migration do influence each
other. A negative relationship was found between land renting and migration. Given
the prevalence of surplus labour and the great scarcity of agricultural land, this
finding implies that creating more off-farm employment opportunities and improving
the functioning ofland rental markets are important mechanisms for increasing
agricultural productivity and rural household incomes, particularly in poor areas.
Policies aimed at building local institutions (e.g., rural credit, off-farm employment
information offices, and land transaction offices) to facilitate land rental activities and
improve access to available off-farm employment opportunities may therefore play an
important role in improving efficiency in agricultural production.
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Appendix 1
Theoretical model of land and labour market participation
A theoretical model ofhousehold decision making can be developed to examine the determinants ofland
rental market participation and off-farm employment. Suppose the household is endowed with labour L,
cultivated land A, household characteristics Zh, and fixed factors Zq. Assume that the household does
not hire additional labour (hiring of additional labour only takes place in peak seasons and is done in
small quantities in the research area; it is therefore left out of our analysis), that the household can
allocate its labour to agricultural production la, off-farm employment 1°, or leisure I at a given wage w,
and that the household can rent land Ain and lease land Aout at a given rent r. So the household can
have income from on-farm agricultural production, off-farm employment and land rental activities. The
household chooses la, 10, I, Ain and Aout to maximize utility:
Max U(y, I, Zh)
la, 10, I
Ain, Aout
Subject to:
y ~ f(la, A, Zq) + wlo - (Ain - Nut)r
la + 10 + I ~ I
A ~ A + Ain - Aout
1° <; lihax (Z)
Nut <; AiWlx (Z)
Ain<;Aillax(Z)
la, 10, I, Ain, Aout " 0
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
where y is the household income; f(la, A, Zq) is the household agricultural production function that
satisfies the standard assumptions; lihax' AiWlx and Aillax are the institutional constraints that limit
household participation in the land and labour markets, where Z are the institutional factors, such as
tenure security, transfer rights and having a social network that affect land rental market participation
and off-farm employment. The price of the agricultural product is set at one; all other prices are
expressed relative to this agricultural product price.
The Lagrangian of the utility maximization problem can be formulated as:
L ~ U[f(la, A, Zq) + wlo - (Ain - Nut)r, I, Zh]
+ fl0[lihax - 1°] + flAin[Aillax - Ain] + flAout[AiWh - Nut]
where flo, ,uAin and flAout are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints on 10, Ain and Aout.
Household optimal labour allocation can be represented by the following first-order condition
(Kuhn-Tucker condition):
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aLIa 1° ~ Uy(-fia + w) - flo <; 0
1°" 0 and 10" (Uy(-fp + w) - /l0) ~ 0
(ra)
where superscript" indicates the optimum level.
The first-order condition can be rearranged as (assuming an interior solution with 1° > 0):
(II)
Equation II shows that the marginal value product of agricultural labour is smaller than the market
wage rate when the off-farm employment constraint is binding.
Household optimal land allocation can be represented by the following first-order conditions:
aL/aAin ~ Uy(fA - r) - ,uAin <; 0
Ain" 0 and Ain" (Uy(fA - r) - ,uAin ) ~ 0
aL/aAout ~ Uy(-fA + r) - /lAout <; 0
Aout" 0 and AOUI"(Uy(-fA + r) - /lAout) ~ 0
(12)
These first-order conditions can be rearranged as (assuming an interior solution for either Ain > 0 01
Aout> 0):
fA ~ r+ /lAin / Uy
fA ~ r-/lAout / Uy
(14)
(IS)
Either Equation 14 or Equation IS holds (or neither holds). In other words, the household either
rents land or leases land (or is self-sufficient in the land market). Equation 14 shows that the marginal
value product ofland is greater than the market land rent when the land renting constraint is binding,
and Equation IS states that the marginal value product ofland is less than the market land rent when the
land leasing constraint is binding.
Based on these first-order conditions, the following reduced-form equations for land rental and off-
farm labour market participation can be derived:
362
1° ~ 1° (Zh, Zq, I, A , w, r, Z)
Ain ~ Ain (Zh, Zq, I, A, w, r, Z)
Aout ~ Aout (Zh, Zq, L, A, w, r, Z)
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(16)
(17)
(18)
